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SRACI
This study is a contribution to research conducted by The RAND Corporation in the field of Same theory. The formulation presented in this Kaaorandum has theoretical application in both military and civilian situations where searcher and evader tactics are involved. At each move Player I, the evader, is allowed to hide in one room, while Player II, the searcher, is allowed to search sows given number of rooms.
The restriction is made that Player I1 searches without repetition, that is, he is never allowed to return to a roam he has previously searched. It is shown that if the payoff to Player I is any increasing function of the number of moves before capture, his
.gat strategy is also never to return to a room in which he has previously hidden.
A formula for the value of the game is presented. The common situation of search versus evasion can be described precisely in the language of game theory: Player 1, the evader, and
Player 11, the searcher, each choose an integer from 1 through N (each integer representing one of N separate rooms). This process is repeated until either a match occurs (i.e., 1I finds I) or the game has run some preselected number n of moves. This situation will be referred to as the general case.
we shall say we are in the special case. (The special case with H * 1 the game discussed in the second paragraph of the introduction.)
Assume first that Player II plays "random permutations," that is -4-equal probability. The main conclusion of this paper is that Player I's best counter-strategy is then also to play random permutations; Player I selects the n-tuple (l,R2 ... R n) randomly and with equal probability from the Iu)n possible permutations of n out of the N integers. But when I plays in this manner, any strategy 11 may choose yields the same expected payoff, which implies that random permutations is the optimuu strategy for both players. In the sequel it is always assumed that Player 11, but not necessarily Player 1. behaves in this way.
Define i(nl,n 2 . .. n.k) as the set of n-tuples (11,R2...R n) involving k distinct integers with frequencies nl,n 2 , . . . .. nk respectively, where
Each element of R(nlpn 2 .... nk) is a pure strategy for Player 1. It is important to note that in the special case, all of these pure strategies (and hence any probabilistic mixture of them) give Player I the same probability of escaping detection for the duration of the game when Player 11 is playing random permutations. We denote this probability by
For convenience we call the set of all mixed strategies for Player I involving only the elements of R(n I,n 2 ... nk) "the strategy S(a, n 2 . k)"
(or, if mo aonfusion is peosible, simply "the strategy ".) Tom
V(nl,a 2 ... ak) S V(S)
is the expected payoff versus random permutations of strategy -5-S(nl,n 2 ... nk) M s in the special case.
(As a specific example of these definitions let N'4, n-3, n 1 l1, n 2 =2. Then (R1,R12,R3) -(2,7,7) and (R1,R 2,R3) -(3,5,3) are both elements of R(nl,n 2 ). The pure strategy for player I "room 2 first move, room 7 second move, room 7 third move" is a member of S(nl,n2), (In other vords, Player I should begin playing the "no return rule" as soon as he is allowed to do so.)
Given strategy S(nl,n 2 , ... Rk), define
(the at are the elementary symetric functions of nln2... .)
Value Theorem (Special Case)
In particular for
which is the value of the game (attained when both players play random perutations.)
Tbeorm 3 (zmAurl case) tandom permutations is the optimsm strategy for both players.
More elaborate results are obtainable in the general case, but they will not be investigated here. It should be noted that theorem 3 holds true reardless of the constants N ... U, , and h•ene they ned not be assummd known to Player I.
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The second halves of Theorems 1 and 2 are stmple consequences of the first statmnts. To prove these it is sufficient to consider only the subcase N -1, since the strategy S a 8(nl, n2 ... k)
for general 1 is equivalent to the strategy S * S(n¢K, n?, ... ohM)
for N -1.
Furthermore, using the obvious notation, if S2 is derived from 3 1 then S2is derived from SI, and if S< then So < S*
In the special subcase with K -I we change notation slightly and denote Player 1l's randomly selected permutation by (r(l), r(2) ... r(n)).
as comented previously, a strategy S(n 1 ,n 2 .. .nk) for Player I can be Main Lema
Then if 1 n 1 kn 2 a ... a nk Pl < P2 -< "' Pk+l -Pk+2 " nP Proof: Set nh -0 for h > k and suppose that for some a and h, nU> nh. Then
The second terms on the right sides of these two equations are equal by sysmetry, and comparing the first terms verifies the lemma. 
